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The efforts for establishing a Single European Market, the recent (i.e. 2004 and 2007) 
enlargements, the overall regional and territorial policy and the introduction of the European 
Neighborhood Policy, represent an array of spatial and non-spatial policies that set up the 
scene in the economic landscape of the European Union border regions. Within this context, 
the objective of the paper is to detect, on empirical grounds, the growth pattern(s) of the 
European Union border regions following a convergence clubs approach. The findings of the 
paper suggest a non-linear process of growth along the EU-27 border regions, indicating that 
the process of integration in Europe is still associated with significant differentiations along 
border areas. 
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 1. Introduction  
Under the global paradigm, borders seem to lose their traditional meaning as demarcations of 
the nation-state, and are perceived more like barriers for expanding international markets. 
Thus, the dynamics of internationalization and globalization are often understood as processes 
of intensification of the exchange of capital, goods, services, labor, knowledge or, even, 
cultural stereotypes (Brenner 2003, 2004; Jessop 2004) in a permeable world. In the European 
Continent, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the East-West dividing line, have 
brought to the fore a new economic and political geography of border regions, affecting 
substantially their growth potential (Petrakos and Topaloglou 2008). In the European Union 
(EU), in particular, the efforts for establishing a Single European Market (SEM), the recent 
(i.e. 2004 and 2007) enlargements, the overall regional and territorial policy and the 
introduction of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), represent the main array of spatial 
and non-spatial policies that set up the scene in the economic landscape of border space 
(Melchior 2008). As a result, internal EU borders are becoming permeable, whereas, at the 
same time, external EU borders function as barriers, behind which other countries are 
excluded, to interaction (Moraczewska 2010).  
Within this context, the objective of the paper is to detect, on empirical grounds, the growth 
pattern(s) of the EU border regions. In contrast to the opinion that spatial interaction means 
automatically convergence (De Boe et al. 2010), it seems that the relationship between 
interaction and convergence is far from being automatic (Decoville et al. 2010). Indeed, 
recent evidence shows that the increase of interaction due to penetrable borders does not 
always go hand-in-hand with convergence (Topaloglou et al. 2005, Alegría 2009). This 
indicates that EU integration often generates winners and losers (in terms of endowments, 
technology, economic structures, level of competitiveness), reflecting a spatial footprint of the 
forces and dynamics driving and shaping the integrated economy (Petrakos 2008). Does EU 
integration contribute to convergence of border regions (i.e. convergence among border 
regions, and convergence with the non-border regions)? A lucid answer to the aforementioned 
question will be able to offer valuable insight for both theory and policy-making.  
To this end, the paper uses a convergence clubs approach (Chatterji 1992). The analysis is 
based on, disaggregated at the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) III 
spatial level, data, covering the period 1995-2005, derived from Cambridge Econometrics 
EUROPEAN REGIONAL Database and elaborated by the authors. The paper is organized as 
follows: The next section briefly outlines the convergence / divergence debate. The third 
section describes the area under consideration and provides some stylized facts. The fourth section investigates econometrically for the emergence of regional convergence clubs among 
the EU regions, focusing on border regions. Finally, the fifth section summarises the findings 
and provides the conclusions.  
 
2. The Convergence / Divergence Debate: A Brief Outline 
The issue of regional convergence / divergence has attracted considerable research interest in 
the regional science literature. Apart from its obvious policy implications, whether economies 
converge or diverge over time, this is an issue of theoretical significance. Since theories have 
an unclear message about the evolution of regional disparities, the study of this issue serves as 
an empirical test among alternative theories with sharply different implications for the 
allocation of activities over space. 
Proponents of the neoclassical theory argue that disparities are bound to diminish with growth 
through the activation of the equilibrating mechanisms of the declining marginal productivity 
of capital (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, for a review). In contrast, other schools of 
thought such as the endogenous (new) growth theories (see Aghion and Howitt 1998, for a 
review) and the new economic geography (see Fujita et al. 1999, for a review) tend to agree 
that growth is a spatially cumulative process, which is likely to increase inequalities, stressing 
the role of policies in balancing growth patterns.  In the midst of this theoretical spectrum, 
there are also some other recent paradigms which point out that it is quite natural to expect 
that groups of (regional) economies are converging but that these groups are themselves 
diverging from each other. These paradigms transcend the “all or nothing” logic behind 
conventional regional convergence / divergence analysis and maintain that convergence may 
come about for different groups of (regional) economies, indicating, thus, the possibility for 
the emergence of (regional) convergence clubs (see Azariadis 1996, for a review).  
  The dominant approach in the convergence / divergence literature is derived from the 
neoclassical paradigm, following the seminal studies of Baumol (1986), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992) and Mankiw et al. (1992). Two main concepts of convergence have been 
developed in this literature: (unconditional or conditional) β-convergence and σ-convergence. 
If economies are homogeneous, convergence can occur in an absolute sense (unconditional β-
convergence) since they will converge towards the same steady-state. This concept implies 
that poor economies grow faster than rich ones and therefore, over a long period of time, they 
converge to the same level of per capita income. Conversely, if economies are heterogeneous, 
convergence may occur only in a conditional sense (conditional β-convergence) since 
economies will grow toward different steady-state positions. The concept of σ-convergence examines the dispersion of income at a given moment in time. Thus, convergence is accepted 
if the dispersion (measured by the coefficient of variation) of per capita income among 
economies falls over time.  
At the regional level, there is ample empirical evidence of this type of research (see Magrini 
2004, for a review). However, most empirical studies have examined convergence / 
divergence processes utilising econometric or statistical models of linear specification as 
suggested by the neoclassical theory (Durlauf 2001). Rather recently, a few empirical studies 
have asserted the presence of nonlinearities in the growth process implying multiple steady-
states and convergence clubs (Chatterji, 1992; Quah, 1993; Durlauf and Johnson, 1995; 
Hansen, 2000). These studies are based on theoretical models that yield multiple (locally 
stable) steady-state equilibria and classify geographical units into different groups with 
different convergence characteristics (for a review, see Azariadis 1996, and Islam 2003).  
Since economic theory does, to a large extent, not offer much guidance, empirical studies 
have come to various conclusions regarding the number and characteristics of groups, affected 
heavily by the particular method employed. At the international level, Baumol and Wolff 
(1988), for instance, using a simple non-linear model, detected the existence of two groups: a 
high income convergence club and a low income divergence one. Quah (1993), based on non 
parametric analysis, identified an emergent twin-peak, implying polarization of countries into 
two different income classes. Durlauf and Johnson (1995), using regression tree analysis, 
found evidence of four regimes, each one subscribing to a different linear model, with 
convergence observed for high income countries and divergence for low incomes ones. More 
recently, at the European regional level, a few empirical studies, using a wide variety of 
methods, have tested and confirmed convergence club hypothesis (Canova 1999, Corrado et 
al. 2005, Ertur et al. 2006, Fischer and Stirböck 2006, Dall’erba et al. 2008, Ramajo et al. 
2008).  
An alternative approach, which requires the identification of a lead economy, to investigate 
the existence of convergence clubs has been proposed by Chatterji (1992). This approach 
relates the economic gap (i.e. the difference between the per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) level of the leading economy and the per capita GDP levels of the other economies) at 
some date with the respective economic gap at an earlier date, including further powers of 
those earlier levels. On empirical grounds, Chatterji (1992) shows, at the international level, 
the existence of two mutually exclusive convergence clubs: one including the rich countries 
and the other including the poor countries. Similar results are obtained by Chatterji and 
Dewhurst (1996) for the regions of Great Britain in the period 1977-1991. Using the same approach, Armstrong (1995) and Kangasharju (1999) do not show evidence of convergence 
clubs for the regions of the EU in the period 1975-1992 and the regions of Finland in the 
period 1934-1993, respectively. In contrast, Artelaris et al. (2010) found evidence of 
convergence clubs in many new EU member-states (NMS).  
  
3. The EU Regions: Some Stylized Facts 
The area under consideration consists of 1,278 EU NUTS III regions, out of which 333 are 
border regions (ESPON 2006) (Figure 1). These regions comprise a highly heterogeneous 
area in terms of size, population, population density, GDP, and GDP per capita (Table 1).  
In terms of size, the smallest and the largest EU border regions are also the largest and the 
smallest EU regions, respectively, overall. The largest EU (border) region is Norrbottens län 
(106,012 km
2) and the smallest is Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla (13 km
2). The former region 
is 8,155 times as much as the latter (which seems to be just like a point on the map). In terms 
of demography, the EU border regions with the more and the least population are Nord 
(2,576,000 inh.) and Außerfern (32,000 inh.), respectively. The former region is almost 81 
times as much as the latter. However, this is not the highest population ratio among NUTS III 
EU regions since the non-border regions of Comunidad de Madrid (5,922,000 inh.) and 
Orkney Islands (20,000 inh.) are the EU regions with the more and the least population, 
respectively. In terms of population density, the most densely populated EU border region is 
Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla (5,087 inh./km
2) and the least densely populated EU border 
region is Lappi (2 inh./km
2). The former region is also the smallest EU region, whereas the 
latter is also the least densely populated region in the EU as a whole. The ratio between them 
is almost 2,544. In terms of GDP, the richest EU border region is Nord (54,708,000,000 €), 
whereas the poorest is Vildin (181,000,000). The ratio between them is almost 303. In terms 
of GDP per capita, the richest EU border region is (the Duchy of) Luxemburg (56,850 €/inh.), 
and the poorest EU border region is Botosani (1,205 €/inh.). The ratio between them is almost 
48. Even though these (i.e. in terms of GDP and GDP per capita) are not the highest ratios, 
since there are other, non-border, regions with highest and lowest figures, the differences are 





 Figure 1: The EU NUTS III (border) regions (the area under consideration) 
 
Sources: ESPON (2006) / Authors’ elaboration 
 
It is exactly the heterogeneity of the area under consideration, which dictates the 
“inadequacy” of linear methods – methods that follow the “all or nothing” logic – for the 
detection of the EU border regions’ growth pattern(s). The estimation of β- and σ-
convergence can offer only a general trend concerning the level and the evolution of regional 
inequalities. This general trend, however, might give a misleading picture since it rules out 
the possibility that economies can form convergence clubs (Chatterji 1992). Hence, regional 
inequalities can be evaluated in a more detailed and informative way, using the approach of 
regional convergence clubs, as proposed by Chatterji (1992). In essence, β-convergence 
analysis, as introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), has been modified and extended by 
Chatterji (1992) in order to incorporate the possibility for the existence of convergence clubs. 
 
 Table 1: Some basic territorial, demographic and economic characteristics of the EU-27 
(border) regions (year 2005) 









Minimum 13  13  Ciudad  Autónoma 
de Melilla  
(ES) 
Ciudad Autónoma de 
Melilla  
(ES) 
Maximum  106,012  106,012  Norrbottens län  
(SE) 





Average 3,363  5,226     











Average 383,000  341,000     




Maximum 20,355 5,087  Paris   
(FR) 
Ciudad Autónoma de 
Melilla   
(ES) 
Population Density  
(inh./km
2) 
Average 114  65     









(€; 2000 prices) 
Average 7,778,000  4,852,000     








GDP per capita  
(€/inh.; 2000 prices) 
Average 20,308  14,226     
Sources: Cambridge Econometrics EUROPEAN REGIONAL Database / Authors’ 
elaboration  
 
 4. The Emergence of Convergence Clubs among the EU Regions: Focusing on EU 
Border Regions 
The investigation for the emergence of regional convergence clubs is based on the 









= γ                                                                                                             (1), 
where  B  denotes the base (initial) year of estimation, F  denotes the final year of estimation, 
r  denotes the regions under consideration (the richest region is excluded), l denotes the 
richest of the regions under consideration (lead region), G  is the difference (gap) of the 
logarithms of the variable under consideration (i.e. per capita GDP) between the lead and each 
of the other regions, γ  (1, 2, …, K ) is the coefficient of G , and k  (1, 2, …, K ) are the 
powers of G . Thus, it is possible for a non-linear relation between the income gap (among 
the richest and the other of the regions under consideration) in an initial year and the 
respective gap in a final year to be found. 
In contrast to the majority of the empirical studies in the convergence / divergence literature, 
the aforementioned equation is going to be estimated using the Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS) (instead of the conventional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)) method. OLS studies tend 
to overlook the relative importance (in terms of population) of each region in the national 
setting, treating all regional observations as equal. Yet, regions (economies) vary widely in 
terms of (relative) population – this is the case concerning the EU (border) regions – and this 
can produce unrealistic or misleading results (Petrakos et al. 2005). Even though comparisons 
are rarely referred to similar-sized economies, this issue has, paradoxically, been almost 
completely ignored in the literature, especially at the regional level. The WLS method, 
however, is able to overcome this major drawback, allowing regions to have an influence, 
which is analogous to their relative size, on the regression results (Petrakos and Artelaris 
2009). 
WLS allow regions (observations) to have an influence on the regression results, according to 
the relative population size, through the weight matrix W . The relative population of each 
region can be used as the diagonal element in the weighting non-singular positive definite 
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= . In this case, the WLS estimator and the estimated covariance matrix are: 
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respectively.   
Following the aforementioned convergence clubs approach, the dependent variable of the 
regional convergence clubs equation is the GDP per capita gap (between the richest and each 
of the other regions under consideration) in the year 2005 ( r l G _ , 2005 ) and the independent 
variable is the respective gap in the year 1995 ( r l G _ , 1995 ) (Table 2). The lead region is the 
richest region in the year 1995 (i.e. Inner London-West). The overall explanatory power of the 
model is very satisfactory. The 
2
. adj R  figure is relatively high and the independent variable has 
a statistically significant impact (at the level of 1%) in all powers. Since considerable 
multicollinearity between the various powers of the independent variable makes difficult the 
choice of the best parsimonious estimation (Chatterji 1992, Chatterji and Dewhurst 1996), the 
final specification of the equations was made under the rule of dropping the statistically 
insignificant terms. When two or more equations had statistically significant coefficients, the 
specification with the lowest figure of the Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike 1973) was 









 Table 2: Convergence clubs among the NUTS III regions of EU (final per capita GDP gap on 





k r l G G ) ( _ , 1995
1
_ , 2005 ∑
=
= γ  
GAP2005 =  = 0.040 GAP1995^3 – 0.248 GAP1995^2 + 1.338 GAP 1995 
                         (0.000)***                   (0.000)***                   (0.000)***                         
2
. adj R = 0.960 
F – statistic = 105.600 (0.000)***   
weighting variable: population 1995 
N = 1278 observations (EU NUTS III regions); 333 are the EU NUTS III border 
regions 
*** statistically significant at the level of 1% 
Sources: Cambridge Econometrics EUROPEAN REGIONAL Database / Authors’ 
elaboration  
 
The estimated function makes evident that the EU regions form convergence clubs (Figure 2). 
Having the function  x y =  (see the dotted straight line)
 as a benchmark, each EU region may 
either converge to the lead region (when the GDP per capita gap in the final year is lower 
compared to the respective gap in the initial year; the line of the estimated function is below 
the line of the benchmark function) or diverge from the lead region (when the GDP per capita 
gap in the final year is higher compared to the respective gap in the initial year; the line of the 
estimated function is above the line of the benchmark function). In particular, regions with 
initial gap in the interval (0, 2.13] diverge from the lead region but converge internally; 
regions with initial gap in the interval (2.13, 3.86] converge both to the lead region and 
internally; regions with initial gap greater than 3.86, diverge both from the lead region and 
internally. Hence, the regions of the first two groups (i.e. initial gaps in the intervals (0, 2.13] 
and (2.13, 3.86]) form a convergence club, since the two groups converge to point 2.13, 




 Figure 2: Convergence clubs among the NUTS III regions of EU (final per capita GDP gap on 
initial per capita GDP gap), Period 1995-2005   
 
Sources: Cambridge Econometrics EUROPEAN REGIONAL Database / Authors’ 
elaboration  
 
The allocation of the EU border regions to the convergence clubs formed among the EU 
regions (Figure 3) accentuates a clear spatial pattern. The regions of Western (with the 
exception of the regions situated along the Spanish-Portuguese borderline) and Northern 
Europe diverge from the lead region and present trends of internal convergence. The majority 
of the regions situated in the EU NMS (exceptions include some regions in Bulgaria, 
Romania, Lithuania and Latvia), the border regions of Greece, and the regions situated along 
the Spanish-Portuguese borderline converge both to the lead region and internally. The rest of 
the EU border regions (i.e. regions situated in Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania and Latvia) 
diverge both from the lead region and internally. Thus, the majority of the EU border regions, 
either diverging from the lead region or converging to the lead region, tend to form one broad 
convergence club. There are some EU NMS regions, however, that present clear trends of 
divergence (from the aforementioned convergence club and internally). It is evident that a 
non-linear process of growth along the EU-27 border regions seems to exist, indicating that 
the process of integration in Europe is still associated with significant differentiations along 
border areas. This heterogeneity in spatial impact, underlines the critical role that geographic 
location and initial conditions (in terms of institutional proximity to the EU) play in the 
economic performance of border regions.  
Figure 3: The allocation of the EU border regions to the convergence clubs formed among the 
EU regions, Period 1995-2005   
 
Sources: Cambridge Econometrics EUROPEAN REGIONAL Database / Authors’ 
elaboration  
 
The previously described spatial pattern allows concluding that, at a macro-geographical 
perspective, there seems to be a distinct differentiation in performance among the “old” and 
the “new” EU border regions. Nevertheless, a meticulous observation brings to light dividing 
lines within the “old” and the “new” EU border regions as well. In particular, the “old’ EU 
border regions do not exhibit patterns of uniformity since the majority of border regions 
belonging to the EU State-founders (“old-old EU”) exhibit different growth patterns 
compared to more distant border regions of the countries entering the EU at a later stage 
(“new-old EU”). Respectively, a dividing line seems to appear among the border regions of 
the countries entering the EU in 2004 (“old-new EU”) and those entering the EU in 2007 
(“new-new EU”). 
 
 5. Conclusions 
The objective of the paper is to detect, on empirical grounds, the growth pattern(s) of the EU 
border regions. To this end, the paper uses a convergence clubs approach (Chatterji 1992). 
The analysis is based on, disaggregated at the NUTS III spatial level, data, covering the 
period 1995-2005.  
The application of the convergence clubs methodology accentuates the clear spatial pattern 
that characterises the EU border regions’ growth process. The majority of the regions of 
Western and Northern Europe diverge from the lead region and present trends of internal 
convergence. The majority of the regions situated in the EU NMS, as well as the rest of the 
regions situated in Western and Northern Europe, converge both to the lead region and 
internally. The rest of the EU border regions diverge both from the lead region and internally. 
Thus, the majority of the EU border regions tend to form one broad convergence club.  
The application of the convergence clubs methodology suggests a non-linear process of 
growth along the EU-27 border regions, indicating that the process of integration in Europe is 
still associated with significant differentiations along border areas. This heterogeneity in 
spatial impact, underlines the critical role that geographic location and initial conditions (in 
terms of institutional proximity to the EU) play in the economic performance of border 
regions. 
More specifically, the findings of the paper suggest that three patterns of growth among the 
EU-27 border regions can be detected. The first type involves the border regions of the more 
advanced EU countries, located in the EU’s economic core, which diverge from the lead 
region and converge internally. The second type includes the majority of the EU NMS border 
regions and also the Spanish-Portuguese and the Greek border zones which converge from the 
lead region and converge internally. The third type is depicted mainly along the Romanian 
and Bulgarian borderlines which diverge from the lead region and diverge internally. 
This spatial pattern allows concluding that, at a macro-geographical perspective, there seems 
to be a distinct differentiation in performance among the “old” and the “new” EU border 
regions. Nevertheless, a meticulous observation brings to light dividing lines within the “old” 
and the “new” EU border regions as well. In particular, the “old’ EU border regions do not 
exhibit patterns of uniformity since the majority of border regions belonging to the EU State-
founders (“old-old EU”) exhibit different growth patterns compared to more distant border 
regions of the countries entering the EU at a later stage (“new-old EU”). Respectively, a 
dividing line seems to appear among the border regions of the countries entering the EU in 
2004 (“old-new EU”) and those entering the EU in 2007 (“new-new EU”).  
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